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ABSTRACT James Harris Ormesher: Examining Federalism in American Water Policy: 
Taking Stock of a Modern Issue  
(Under the direction of Jody Holland) 
 
 
As American water resources fall under increasing scrutiny, with shortages costing 
millions of dollars annually, questions about the effectiveness of the policy managing 
these resources arises. In particular blurred responsibilities and goals generated as a result 
of the American federalist system raise questions about the nature of the state and federal 
relationship and the ability of it effectively develop a functioning water policy. To garner 
an understanding of American federalism, American water policy, and the relationship 
between them, I utilized a comparative analysis of both the history of water policy and 
federalism in America. Following this history, I offer an analysis for understanding the 
state and federal levels of water policy. In this analysis, I argue that the state level 
evolution of water policy is highly adaptable, and well suited to handle issues associated 
with supply, demand, and allocation. Contrarily, the federal government is well equipped 
to deal with interstate resources and issues where benefits are not as easily quantified in 
market terms. However, as a result of the evolution of federal water policy and trends in 
federal devolvement, the federal government may be fragmented to the point where it is 
not able to properly address the inadequacies in the state government’s water policies. To 
remedy this I propose the following three solutions. A) centralize federal legislative and 
bureaucratic institutions, B) create watershed planning organizations, and C) undertake a 
National Water Assessment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the past, America has always considered itself a land of plenty, and water is no 
exception. It is estimated that America has the 4th most renewable internal freshwater 
sources in the world ("Renewable Internal," n.d.).This has been incredibly useful, as 
water is important not only in sustaining life, but in developing an economy, industry, 
and agricultural system.  As a result of a growing population and an upward trend in per 
capita water use, today America consumes water at an impressive rate (Donnelly & 
Cooley, 2015). Since 1900, the United States has gone from consuming just less than 50 
billion gallons of water per day, to consuming 440 billion gallons of water per day at a 
peak in 1980 (Donnelly & Cooley, 2015). In 2012, one study estimated that the U.S. had 
the third highest water footprint of any country, and the largest water footprint per capita 
of any country (Hoekstra & Mekonnen, 2012). And while this increase in water use does 
not indicate a problem, increased demand and a deeper understanding of our water 
resources draw concerns about possible water shortages in the United States.  
In a 2003 survey, 36 out of 40 state water managers interviewed foresaw water 
shortages occurring in the next ten years (Government Accountability, 2014).In  2013, 
there was an increase to 40 out of 50 state water managers who foresaw water shortages 
occurring in the next ten years (Government Accountability, 2014). What becomes 
increasingly interesting is the reasons cited regarding water shortages  
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Between 2003 and 2013, many reasons for concern about water shortages stayed 
the same. In particular both surveys indicated an emphasis on increases in population 
placing strain on the water supply, as well as a lack of  “comprehensive information on 
water availability and use”, creating difficulties in water management and planning 
(Government Accountability, 2014). With the population expecting to increase 
significantly by 2030, it is not surprising that water shortage was a consistent point of 
concern in managing the water supply (Government Accountability, 2014). Additionally, 
with no comprehensive study on water availability and use taking place since 1978, 
incomplete information is listed as contributing to an inability to adequately manage 
water resources (Government Accountability, 2014). And while this 1978 report listed 
threats to the water supply that have come to fruition, such as inadequate surface water 
resources, pollution of water, and overdraft of ground water, many new issues have risen 
to prominence as well (United States, 1978, p. 3,)  
For example, in 2013, surveyed water managers placed an increased emphasis on 
many new issues. In particular, managers discussed concerns that climate change and 
extreme weather patterns could impact water resources (Government Accountability, 
2014). In addition concerns over water quality and shortages are highlighted. As a result 
of water shortages and reduced access to clean drinking water, there are both economic 
and human costs.  
For instance in agriculture, where the impacts of drought translate more 
obviously, we have seen economic losses in a variety of states. In 2015, when California 
was experiencing its fourth straight year of drought, it is estimated that the agriculture 
industry lost billions. In 2015, a study at the University of California Davis calculated 
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that there was a $2.7 billion loss in the agriculture sector (Howitt, MacEwan, Medellín-
Azuara, Lund, & Sumner, 2015). Furthermore, this study indicated a loss of over 10,000 
seasonal farm jobs in the state of California. This story is not entirely unique to 
California. In Texas in 2011, it was estimated that losses as high as $7.2 billion occurred 
as a result of drought damaged crops (Guerrero, 2012).  This represented the biggest 
monetary loss Texas had received as a result of drought in one year by more than by $3.5 
billion (Fannin, 2012).  
While America is typically known for its relatively high quality of water, it has 
become more obvious that pollution and access to safe drinking water is not necessarily 
an issue reserved exclusively for developing countries. In areas across America, reports 
of polluted drinking water have emerged. One study shows that from samples taken 
between 2013 and 2015, 194 water supplies in 33 different states had over acceptable 
levels for contamination of poly- and perfluoroalkyl substances (PSAFs), a substance 
which has been linked to cancer in humans (Feldscher, 2016). While this number 
represents a widespread threat to American drinking water supplies, it is from only one 
particular substance. Unfortunately, this means it does not represent the entirety of the 
problems facing the American water supply.  
Another modern case worth examining is the Flint Water Crisis and some of the 
impacts it is having across America. In 2014, Flint, Michigan decided to switch from 
paying the city of Detroit to pump water out of Lake Huron, instead opting to use the 
Flint River and pump water themselves (Franz, 2017).  This was supposed to be a 
cheaper option to secure drinking water for the city (Franz, 2017). However, the Flint 
River’s corrosive water was not treated with a corrosion inhibitor, resulting in high levels 
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of lead leaching into the cities drinking water supply (Franz, 2017). Flint’s water 
contained lead at a rate 10 times higher than the safe water levels set by the EPA (Franz, 
2017). As a result of these high lead levels, one professor at the University of Columbia 
Mailman School of Public Health estimates that there could be $395 million in social 
costs resulting from the 8,000 children believed to have been exposed to lead since 2014 
(Whitcomb, 2016). 
 And while tragic, this issue is not confined to the boundaries of Flint, Michigan. 
In America today, there are believed to be more than 6 million lead pipes in use for water 
systems scattered across the states (Dolan, 2016). While many of these pipes are located 
in older urban areas such as the Northeast and Midwest, the companies running these 
systems are often unsure of the exact locations and number of these pipes (Dolan, 2016; 
Spangler, 2016). This can make it difficult to know which utilities are at a higher risk for 
lead poisoning. Given the complexity and danger of the situation, in the wake of the Flint 
crisis, Fitch Rating Agency calculated that costs could exceed $275 billion in order to 
replace lead pipes (Dolan, 2016).  
While problems related to water in terms of availability, supply, and quality exist 
in obvious ways, the solutions to these problems do not necessarily manifest themselves 
as clearly. The federalist system of governance respects both states’ independence 
between each other, as well as a level of sovereignty from federal authorities. This means 
responsibilities are frequently muddled between states and the federal governments, and 
jurisdictions between states are disconnected. As a result, deciding who solves problems 
and how to solve problems is complicated. This system, while confusing, is a reality of 
federal governance. However the development of policies governing water resources may 
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offer insight into the relationship between the state and federal government in order to 
develop solutions to some of the problems facing water policy today.  
Given the importance of water and the issues facing water resources in America 
today, understanding the problems tied to the federalist system could prove incredibly 
useful. As a result, the intent of this thesis is to understand the evolution of American 
water policy and provide recommendations to enhance the relationships between federal 
and state water politics. First, I will present a history of the evolution of American 
federalism, as well as the history of the evolution of water policy in America. In 
examining American water policy, the historical analysis will focus on water policy both 
at the federal level and the state level in order to garner an understanding of the system. 
In chapter three, I will present the findings and outline how the American water system 
exists and functions today, as well as some of the issues facing the system. In chapter 
four, I will offer an analysis of why the systems came to be this way, as well as the 
strengths and weaknesses of the given model for governing at the two distinct levels of 
government. In chapter five, I will provide recommendations for actions the government 
should take to better the relationship between the state and federal governments in order 
to reach better water policy outcomes as well as a conclusion. 	  
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Chapter 2: Historical Narrative 
 
Federalism  
Since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, the American government 
has operated in a federalist system of governance. A federal system is defined as a system 
where two or more authorities share sovereignty in an area (Boyd, 1997).  As this system 
functions in America, it results in federal rulings that are final on some issues and state or 
local rulings being final on other issues (Boyd, 1997). As a result, for a federal system to 
exist, three criteria must be meet; 1) an ability for two or more authorities to interact in 
one territory, 2) each authority must have its own sphere of power, regardless if these 
spheres interact or not, and 3) neither of these authorities is capable of destroying the 
other (Boyd, 1997).  
This portion of the historical narrative will offer a history of the evolution of 
federalism in America to offer insight into the way the system exists today and the factors 
affecting it. I will examine trends in the roles of the state and federal government and the 
events that impact these relationships in order to categorize different approaches and 
periods of federalism in America.  
Dual Federalism  
 After the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the American 
government was operating under a system of dual federalism. Under a system of dual 
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federalism, it was understood that the state and national governments have separate and 
distinct authorities (Boyd, 1997). A popular analogy for dual federalism is a layered cake. 
In this metaphor, the entirety of that cake is the American government as a whole, with 
the state, local, and federal authorities having their distinct layers that stack on top of one 
another.  
The early period of “state centered” dual federalism took place from the 
ratification of the Constitution in 1789 until the resolution of the civil war in 1865 
(Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). This period was characterized largely by little collaboration 
between state and federal actors, as well as debates over the nature of the union and what 
that meant for the roles of both the state and federal government, with the national 
government largely deffering to state decision-making in most matters other than the 
military (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). In particular, the introduction of the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution in 1791 characterize the atmosphere of the time: “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” (U.S. Const. amend. X).  
During this time, as a result of the understanding of the federalist relationship, the 
Doctrine of Nullification theory and Doctrine of Secession theory became popular, 
particularly in the southern states. The Doctrine of Nullification stated that the states had 
a right to nullify laws and rulings made by the federal government “void and of no force” 
in their territory if the state ruled the legislation was unconstitutional (Boyd, 1997; 
Botsch, 2008). This stemmed from an understanding of the union where the national 
government was viewed as existing solely as a result of state compact, with delegated 
powers to aid the states in matters the states could not undertake (Boyd, 1997; Botsch, 
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2008). Developed in 1798 in the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures, this concept of 
nullification would be established and eventually made popular by Vice President 
Calhoun (Bassani, 2014, Boyd, 1997; Botsch, 2008; The Editors of Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 2012). The Doctrine of Nullification would most famously be used by South 
Carolina in the late 1820’s to argue that South Carolina could block federal tariffs in what 
would come to be known as the nullification crisis (Bassani, 2014, Boyd, 1997; Botsch, 
2008; The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012;).  
The Doctrine of Secession was a similar theory, based in the concept of the Union 
existing solely as a result of state compact (Bassani, 2014, Boyd, 1997). The Doctrine of 
Secession argued that, as a result of the union existing through a state compact, states 
should have the right to secede it if they saw fit (Bassani, 2014, Boyd, 1997).  During this 
period however, “state centered” theories of federalism were not the only theories being 
considered. This resulted in rising tensions through the union.  
In the McCulloch v. Maryland case of 1819, Congress tried to charter the second 
national bank following the expiration of the first national bank’s charter (Botsch, 2008; 
Boyd, 1997). However, states then protested that a federal bank was not a power outlined 
in the Constitution, and therefore, was not a power held by the federal government 
(Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). However, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld 
Congress’s ability to charter the second national bank, with the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court John Marshall citing the necessary proper clause of the Constitution as 
supplying implied power. (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). This clause gave Congress the 
ability “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
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Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” (U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 8). According to Chief Justice Marshall, while a bank was not explicitly listed 
as a right of the federal government, it was “necessary and proper” to carry out the 
explicitly expressed powers of Congress, such as taxing and issuing currency (Botsch, 
2008; Boyd, 1997). This generated the Doctrine of Implied Powers, in which it became 
understood that the federal government’s powers would surpass the powers explicitly 
listed in the Constitution (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). This use of the “necessary and 
proper clause” would be instrumental in undercutting the reservoir of authority for the 
states established by the Tenth Amendment (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). Furthermore this 
case established the Doctrine of National Supremacy, in which federal authority was 
understood to supersede state and local law. This occurred as a result of Chief Justice 
John Marshall ruling that states should not have the power to tax the federal government, 
as then states could destroy the national government (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). Chief 
Justice Marshall argued that the federal government’s laws and legislation must 
supersede the legislation of states to remain indestructible as a result of their being 
outside states sphere of influence (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). This understanding would 
prove important and cemented federal law as the law of the land (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 
1997). Furthermore, in 1824, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had 
the ability to regulate interstate commerce in any way not expressly forbidden in the 
Constitution (Boyd, 1997). While these doctrines did not result in a great deal of actual 
intervention in state affairs by the federal government during that period, these 
precedents laid groundwork for a great deal of federal expansion. 
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As outlined above, the assumptions underlying the doctrines of national 
supremacy and implied powers stand in contrast to the Doctrines of Nullification and 
Secession. In the Nullification Doctrine, one sees the idea of the union being merely a 
product of state compact, and thus a servant to the needs of the states. In the national 
Supremacy Doctrine, and the Implied Powers Doctrine, the union could be generated as a 
result of the American people, and thus existing as an indestructible entity not tethered to 
the states for its sole authority and purpose. Urged on by increasing tensions surrounding 
states’ ability to regulate slavery internally, the debate over whether the union existed 
exclusively as a result of state compact came to a head.  
By seceding in the early 1860’s, the southern states enacted the Doctrine of 
Secession, and Lincoln responded in turn by declaring that the states had in fact not left 
the union at all (Botsch, 2008). In Lincoln’s victory, the debate was resolved to some 
extent, with the concept of the union merely existing as a result of state compact largely 
dying. What would follow the end of the Civil War in 1865 until the turn of the century 
was a period of “nation centered” dual federalism, where national supremacy was 
understood (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997).  
While a separation of state and federal powers was largely still in play during this 
period, it seemed federal centered decision-making at the national level could have taken 
stage. With the passage of the 14th Amendment in 1878, this period did feature the 
exercising of federal authority. This concept of intervention in social and civil rights 
issues was seen during reconstruction. This demonstrated the power of the federal 
government and created precedent for later federal expansion.  However, as 
industrialization was booming, wealth seemed to protect business malpractices and 
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corruption from a great deal of federal reach (Botsch, 2008). When the federal 
government would attempt to regulate business practices, states would block federal 
intervention and then remain inactive in regulating the practices (Botsch, 2008).  This 
created a sort of twilight zone between the Civil War and early 1900’s where little actual 
change occurred in the federalist relationship (Botsch, 2008). 
Cooperative Federalism  
Cooperative federalism is best explained as a system in which the state and 
federal government develop relationships and divide or share responsibilities with each 
other to reach certain goals (Botsch, 2008). This form of federalism is often explained as 
a marbled cake, where the levels of government’s responsibilities and boundaries 
intermix and are not particularly clear. However, the parts technically are still distinct.  
Starting with President Theodore Roosevelt’s inauguration, we began to see shifts 
in the breaking down of states’ abilities to block federal intervention in business practice, 
and that trends increased federal involvement in state responsibilities. Discontented with 
the corruption of industrial businessmen at the time, Roosevelt would have legislation 
passed allowing federal regulation of business (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1977). This included 
regulation of railroads, food and drugs, and removed the ability of the states to block 
federal intervention, all of which expanded federal powers (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1977). 
This was part of Roosevelt’s New Nationalism movement, which aimed to consolidate 
and centralize federal powers in order to allow the federal government to more 
adequately respond to national problems (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1977). Additionally, 
during this time, the federal and state governments became more collaborative in their 
solutions and roles. In particular, the federal government initiated the grant-in-aid system 
programs (Boyd, 1977). These grant programs would quickly gain popularity and would 
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have over $30 million of grants by 1920 (Boyd, 1977).  These grant systems would be 
instrumental in ushering in the age of cooperative federalism at large and creating 
federalism as it is understood today. 
Under Woodrow Wilson’s administration, the federal government began making 
large strides forward in terms of federal power with the establishment of the federal 
income tax under the 16th amendment (Boyd, 1997).  This income tax would allow for a 
great deal of expansion for federal programs. These grant programs frequently took the 
form of categorical grants. Categorical grants are grants in which lumps of federal 
funding are distributed to state and local governments for very particular purposes and 
often have heavy regulation attached to the grant money (Botsch, 2008). These grants can 
take a number of forms. Three of these are 1) matching grants: where the federal 
government will match a certain amount for every dollar spent by a state on a given cause 
up to a certain threshold, 2) formula grants: where states are given a certain amount of 
money based on a set of measurable criteria, and 3) project grants or competitive grants: 
where different applications are made and evaluated against each other for federal 
funding related to a particular issue or cause (Botsch, 2008). Furthermore, after funding 
had been granted to a state by the federal government, the federal government was able to 
threaten funding if the states did not meet additional regulation later (Botsch, 2008). As 
the federal budget increased, so would grant programs, and the federal ability to operate 
increasingly in domestic affairs.  
  This concept of federal involvement in domestic affairs was taken to a previously 
unprecedented place under the FDR administration during the great depression. As a 
result of economic hardship, states had a large inability to effectively operate (Botsch, 
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2008; Boyd, 1997). This allowed for the federal government to step in, solving problems 
the states could not. In solving these problems, the government consolidated and created 
many federal programs utilizing centralized solutions for national problems (Botsch, 
2008; Boyd, 1997).  
This concept became a reality in FDR’s New Deal. FDR’s new deal established 
16 ongoing federal programs, largely related to stabilizing the economy. These programs 
attempted to stabilize the economy by focusing on creating long term jobs, driving up 
agriculture prices, and helping people make house payments in order to keep banks afloat 
(America's Great, n.d.; Boyd, 1997). These programs increased the reach of the federal 
government in a way not previously seen. By taking advantage of a national crisis, and 
rallying the people around the central government, FDR passed legislation enabling 
federal commerce regulation, federal programs working towards living standards of 
citizens, social security programs for the elderly, the establishment of unions, and a 
federally regulated work force (Botsch, 2008). While initially FDR’s programs had 
trouble being implemented, states’ needs for economic aid, and FDR’s threats to change 
the size of the Supreme Court would allow for the passage of these policies (Botsch, 
2008). 
This ongoing centralization of political power would continue through until the 
1960’s when President Johnson ushered in a new reign of creative federalism. 
Creative Federalism 
The period spanning from 1960 to 1968, the years of President Johnson’s 
influence, are largely referred to as the period of creative federalism.  In this period, 
Johnson increased the federal role in domestic decision-making. Johnson did this through 
the use of the grant-in-aid systems and federal regulation in order to have state and local 
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actors implement national agendas and policies (Boyd, 1997). Where Johnson could not 
have states act as intermediaries for national agendas, he would have the national 
government directly intervene (Boyd, 1977).   
In particular Johnson’s Great Society Initiative sought to use the federal 
government and regulation to create socially favorable outcomes for the nation (Botsch, 
2008; Boyd, 1997). To spur state and local governments, Johnson would use grants to 
encourage the development of policy that reflected federal interest (Boyd, 1997). He 
would do this through both traditional categorical grants as well as newer blocked grants 
(Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). These blocked grants are a result of previously separate 
grants being consolidated into one account, and used for multiple purposes (Botsch, 
2008). These grants would then be redistributed with less specific requirements in order 
to allow a greater amount of flexibility for state and local governments (Botsch, 2008). In 
doing this, states were encouraged to come up with nuanced solutions to problems in 
their jurisdiction in accordance with federal goals. Johnson used a combination of block 
and categorical grants in order to extend federal reach into what had previously been 
states’ affairs (Botsch, 2008). These areas included nutrition and hunger, medical care for 
the elderly and poor, highway systems and transportation, housing, and the arts (Botsch, 
2008). 
In other cases, the federal government would intervene and directly assume 
responsibility for particular services. This would often be achieved using litigation or 
legislation to justify their actions (Botsch, 2008). Issues relating to civil rights are a good 
example of these practices, as when states failed to supply equal protection under the law 
to their citizens as afforded in the 14th amendment, the federal government directly 
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intervened. The federal government would intervene in order to make sure the states meet 
the amendments implications based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation (Botsch, 
2008).  
This concept of forceful federal action and intervention aimed toward particular 
social outcomes was enabled largely by the litigation of the Supreme Court at the time. 
For instance in Baker v. Carr, the court required all of the states apart from Oregon to 
reapportion their districts to represent equivalent population size, as it was ruled 
urbanization had resulted in districts that were no longer in accordance with the 14th 
Amendment’s equal representation (Boyd, 1997).   
  Under President Johnson’s administration, as Boyd (1997) points out, it seems 
that the government went from being strictly a servant of the states with federal action 
being viewed as an often justifiable and necessary evil to a system with its own goals and 
capable of taking action if a national goal could be articulated. Using this approach, 
Johnson created more programs than any other president with the exception of FDR 
(Botsch, 2008). As Botsch (2008) notes, by the end of the Johnson administration, the 
federal government had more responsibilities than arguably any other period. However, 
while some of these trends would be continued in the Nixon administration, particularly 
with the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, the end of Johnson’s 
presidency rung in a new era of federalism in which the federal role would diminish 
(Reimer, 2013, “History of the EPA”, n.d.). 
New Federalism and Devolvement  
New federalism was a period of federalism largely characterized by shifts in the 
intergovernmental grant systems, decentralization of previously held federal 
responsibilities, and debates over the nature of the federal system (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 
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1997). This period began in some sense under Nixon and would serve as a trajectory for 
federalism as it would come to exist today (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997).  
Through the 60’s and 70’s questions concerning the grant system’s fragmentation 
resulting in inefficiencies began to arise (Boyd, 1997). As a result, grant reform would 
become an attractive option for potential legislation (Boyd, 1997). Both the Nixon and 
Ford Administrations saw shifts to revenue sharing systems as well as further 
consolidation of existing grant programs into block grants (Boyd, 1997). This returned 
some flexibility in decision making to state governments that had previously been held by 
the federal government (Boyd, 1997). These general revenue sharing systems were a 
change in the grant systems that served as a sort of antithesis to categorical grants. 
General revenue sharing programs work by funding being given to state and local 
governments with virtually no regulation attached (Botsch, 2008). This allowed funds to 
be used at the state and local government’s discretion, whether that is for new facilities or 
reducing taxes on local populations (Botsch, 2008). These grants began in 1972 under 
Nixon, and would continue until 1987 when Reagan would eventually cut them (Botsch, 
2008). Similarly, the Supreme Court applied these ideas of decentralization as well when 
in 1976 they struck down the Fair Labor Standards Act’s of 1974, ruling the federal 
legislation unconstitutional (Boyd, 1997). 
While returning power and responsibility to states was a gradual trend in the Nixon 
and Ford presidencies, the Reagan administration made a concerted and articulated 
attempt to return to a more state centered form of federalism (Boyd,1997; Botsch, 2008). 
In his speeches Reagan discussed the ideas of the federal government being inefficient, 
and of the union being generated as a result of state compact (Boyd, 1997). As a result of 
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these views, the Reagan administration actively removed the federal government from 
many areas of decision-making, and sought to reduce the size of the federal government 
(Botsch, 2008, Boyd, 1997). These trends in reduction of federal authority are now 
known as devolvement (Botsch, 2008, Boyd, 1997). 
 To accomplish these goals, Reagan would cut the general revenue sharing programs 
in 1987 as a way to reduce the federal deficit (Botsch, 2008). Reagan also consolidated a 
great deal of social programs into block grants to increase state responsibility, flexibility, 
and authority (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). In some cases after blocking grants, Reagan 
then reduced the overall funding of these block grant programs to continue reductions in 
government spending (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). This empowerment of state 
governments being well received by the public, and a strong economy enabling high 
functioning local governments kept trends of devolvement continuing through a 
Democratic presidency (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997).  
In 1993, President Clinton took office and would eventually work with a Republican 
dominated Congress to reduce the federal role in domestic politics (Botsch, 2008).  
Clinton’s Reinventing Government Initiative, as well as the Republican Contract with 
America, sought to rearrange federal power relationships (Boyd, 1997). The Reinventing 
Government Initiative resulted most immediately in policy focusing on the efficiency of 
the federal government in order to avoid excess spending and encourage review reform 
for grant programs (Boyd, 1997). The Contract with America, which outlined ten 
priorities the Republican Congress would work towards in their first 100 days, contained 
several items relating to changing the power structure between the states and the federal 
government (Boyd, 1997). These initiatives resulted not only in the passing of unfunded 
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federal mandate legislation, which required the federal government to do cost/ benefit 
analysis for state and local governments impacted by unfunded mandates, but also 
spurred conversations about block granting or cutting numerous federal programs (Boyd, 
1997).  Furthermore, legislation was passed consolidating a number of social programs 
during the Clinton administration, particularly welfare (Botsch, 2008, Boyd; 1997). 
Clinton and the 104th Congress changed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
formula grant to the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families block grant (Botsch, 2008, 
Boyd, 1997).  
This devolvement continued in the Supreme Court through the 1990’s as well, when 
in 1995 the Supreme Court took a slim 5-4 majority of conservative and state rights 
advocating justices (Boyd, 1997). As a result of this, states rights advocates saw a 
number of victories in the Supreme Court. In United States v. Lopez, the verdict narrowed 
the rule of the commerce clause to not allow the federal government to regulate guns near 
schools in states, and in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of state autonomy, deciding that Native American tribes could not sue states over 
gambling compacts on Indian Land (Boyd, 1997). As Bianco & Canon (2013) note, 
during this period of devolvement in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the Supreme Court would 
overturn more federal laws than it had in the previous 200 years. 
Modern Cooperative Federalism 
Today, America still utilizes a cooperative form of federalism. However, a form 
of federalism with a more equal distribution of power than has been seen previously.  
The effectiveness of federal regulation and its ability to coerce state action has 
kept it as a relevant policy tools (Bianco & Canon, 2013; Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997). 
This option has been brought in check by a number of factors, including the Supreme 
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Court taking an active role on states behalf, Clinton and the Contract with America 
generating policy regulating the use of unfunded federal mandates, and the trend towards 
block grants lessening federal control over grant use (Bianco & Canon, 2013, Botsch, 
2008, Boyd, 1997). However, a tendency to turn to the national government in times of 
crisis, the civil rights movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s, and the maintenance of the 
Doctrine of National Supremacy keeps federal government from losing a real ability to 
interact with many areas of policy (Bianco & Canon, 2013). This has resulted in a form 
of cooperative federalism where the traditional “marble cake” metaphor for federalism 
may not be appropriate.  
Instead of the “marble cake” metaphor, where the federal government and state 
governments relationship resembles a marbled cake, what Bianco & Cannon (2013) call a 
“picket fence” metaphor is more appropriate. As a result of actors at all government 
levels being more equally empowered, actors at the federal, state, and local levels are 
required to work across a metaphorical “picket fence” in order to accomplish goals in 
policy areas, where the picket fence is the different levels of government (Bianco & 
Canon, 2013). This generates more conversations between policy actors at various levels 
than in the past. With the federal actors holding the grant money and an agenda, and the 
states holding an understanding of nuanced implementation and responsibility to do so, 
these two groups must work together to reach their respective goals.   
   While a dynamic and ever changing system, the evolution of federalism has 
resulted in a complex series of checks and balances that requires cooperation and 
interaction between state and federal actors if it is going to be successful.  
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Water Policy  
With water being such a foundational part of a society as well as a valuable 
economic tool, it is not surprising that a robust system for managing this resource has 
developed. However, as a result of the American federal system of governing, there have 
historically been relatively distinct roles between federal and state responsibilities in 
water management. In this section, I will explore the evolution of water policy at the state 
and federal levels in order to gain an understanding of the history of water policy.  First I 
will explore the evolution of water policy at the federal level. Next, I will explore the 
development of water doctrines at state levels. In particular, I will examine the 
differences between the way the east and the west coasts have developed their water and 
the policies that regulate it.  
Historical Trends in Federal Water Policy 
The federal government is not explicitly given the power to regulate waterways of 
the United States. However, it has come to do so by deriving power from interpreting the 
Commerce Clause in Article 1 of the Constitution.  This clause lists the power of the 
federal government to “regulate commerce ... among the several States”, and in 
conjunction with the “necessary and proper” clause has been used to grant Congress the 
ability to carry out these powers (Austin & Myers, 2007, p. 1-3). Over time, this has 
resulted in the federal government expanding its powers to address issues of national 
scope (Austin & Myers, 2007). However, this did not happen altogether, and as some 
have noted, trends in federal water policy often reflected interests of the government at 
the time, as well as trends and concerns in water consumption during policy 
implementation (Reimer, 2013).   
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As water policy began to emerge in the 19th century, much of water policy and 
regulation was left to the states to decide, particularly regarding issues of allocation and 
use of the water supply (Reimer, 2013; Getches, 2001). This practice started both in the 
eastern regions of the United States as well as the western regions. In the eastern regions, 
this can be attributed largely to water conflict and management issues being a relative 
non-issue, and the nature of the dual federalism separating water policy from federal 
control.  In the western regions, where management of these resources seemed politically 
possible, attempting to legislate or manage these resources seemed counter productive, 
logistically infeasible, or unnecessary. 
Water regulation was counterproductive, as policy interest focused on 
development and settlement, which required agriculture and mining (Getches, 2001). As 
both agriculture and mining require a great deal of water, the federal government took a 
hands off approach to water management and let individuals sort disputes out at the local 
(Getches, 2001). At the time the federal government had the legal ability to regulate 
water policy fully. Also the federal government may have lacked the ability to 
functionally enforce any regulation (Getches, 2001; Reimer, 2013). This disinterest in 
allocation, both as a function of constitutionality and a function of simplicity would come 
to characterize a great deal of the historical approach to water (Reimer, 2013). This 
approach would ultimately allow the states to develop their unique water allocation 
policies (Reimer, 2013).  
While water allocation was left to the states, 19th century federal policy continued 
to focus on development, with projects improving rivers and waterways’ economic 
capabilities (Getches, 2001, Reimer, 2013).  This mentality is reflected in the United 
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States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) taking up the management of the United 
States’ water infrastructure (Reimer, 2013). This was particularly fitting as the USACE 
carried the expertise in large projects such as ones that were necessary to develop water 
based transportation infrastructure (Reimer, 2013). This was a recurring theme through 
the 19th and 20th centuries, as large-scale construction projects aimed at the infrastructural 
development of water resources were common.  
The 20th century brought with it a transition from a system of dual federalism to 
one of cooperative federalism. The federal government increasingly extended its reach 
into areas previously under state control, and water was no exception (Reimer, 2013). At 
the turn of the 20th century, the first federal legislation regulating pollution of any kind 
came with the Harbors and Rivers Act of 1899. This act, known as the Refuse Act, 
established a need for permits for discharging waste into navigable American waters, and 
gave the government the ability to impose fines on perpetrators (“Criminal Liability,” 
1972). However, keeping in line with previously mentioned goals of development in the 
19th and 20th centuries, this legislation was a part of a bill largely designed to influence 
rivers as an economic and transportation tool, and not particularly as an environmental 
resource (Newman, 2006, Reimer, 2013). Furthermore, the continuing introduction of 
federal agencies, such as the U.S. Reclamation Service, allowed the government to 
continue to expand its authority (Reimer, 2013). Simultaneously the Roosevelt 
administration brought with it progressive policies and a renewed emphasis on 
development (Reimer, 2013). This focus on infrastructural development shifted from 
being exclusively on commerce to encompass interests in irrigation, storage, power 
generation, and flood control (Reimer, 2013, Getches, 2001).  This shift in interest 
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reflected shifts in water use from agriculture to industry and manufacturing in the 
beginning of the 20th century (Reimer, 2013, Getches, 2001).   
In the second half of the 20th century, water use shifted from agriculture, industry, 
and manufacturing, to agriculture, drinking water supply, and recreational use (Getches, 
2011). Furthermore, a midcentury environmental consciousness movement combined 
with declining drinking quality and growing demands for drinking water to result in a 
great deal of interest in water quality (Reimer, 2013). As a result, the national 
government began passing legislation to protect the water supply from pollution (Reimer, 
2013,).  
Originally introduced in 1948, the Federal Water Pollution Act was the first 
federal legislation that aimed to address pollution in the water supply ("History of the”, 
2015).  As public interest grew, a series of amendments would be passed incrementally 
increasing the capabilities of the federal government to regulate water quality until the 
legislation became known as the Clean Water Act ("History of the Clean”, 2015).  This 
act, in conjunction with the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, enabled the federal 
government to hold states to particular water standards (Reimer, 2013; "Summary of the 
Safe”, 2015). Furthermore, this legislation enabled the federal government to intervene if 
these standards were not meet (Reimer, 2013; "Summary of the Safe”, 2015). These acts 
empowered agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency to hold states 
accountable and to serve as extensions of federal interest (Reimer, 2013, “History of the 
EPA”, n.d.). While these standards guaranteed higher water quality standards for citizens, 
they also began to blur the lines between state and federal water rights (Reimer, 2013). 
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As the federal government forced cooperative answers to pollution problems, coercive 
powers of creative federalism practices became obvious (Reimer, 2013). 
 With the environmental movement continuing to gain momentum through the 
latter half of the 20th century, the federal government increased the amount of water 
quality legislation, while simultaneously stopping the major infrastructural projects seen 
in the 19th and 20th century (Reimer, 2013). The ceasing of the major infrastructural 
projects was caused mostly by the National Environmental Policy Act, which required 
environmental impact analysis of future federal projects (Reimer, 2013). This change 
resulted in a shift of development projects from federal control towards more regionally 
authorized governing bodies (Reimer, 2013). These projects not strictly being governed 
by state or federal governments reflected a collaborative form of federalism and would 
come to exemplify how federal actors would rely on local governments for the 
implementation of water policy (Reimer, 2013)  
In 1981, Reagan taking office further decentralized federal water policy, Reagan 
emphasized state rights and devolvement swept through the federal government. Thus 
water policy decisions and management of projects were shifted from the federal 
government to the states (Reimer, 2013). For example states regulating pollution 
standards, as opposed to the federal government, became more prevalent (Reimer, 2013)  
 As a result of decentralization of water policy, and a continuing interest in water 
quality, a new approach in managing these issues through the 1980’s and 1990’s 
developed (Reimer, 2013). Watershed approaches, where one examines the watershed of 
a particular resource in developing policy, drove interstate and cross agency collaboration 
(Reimer, 2013). This trend in interstate collaboration would continue to be reflected in 
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federal policy, as collaborative tools and partnerships with the private sector became 
more prevalent in almost all policy areas (Botsch, 2008; Boyd, 1997; Reimer, 2013). A 
continuing interest in water as a resource and a greater understanding of the 
interconnected nature of these resources continue to drive watershed approaches in water 
policy today (Reimer, 2013).  
Moving into the modern era of water policy, the federal government once again 
began taking a more active role in state water decisions, as legislation forced states to 
increase conservation efforts. Acts such as the 1999 Water Resources Development Act 
required states to take over projects typically handled by the United States Army Corp of 
Engineers, while the expansion of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
reflected the continued quest for improved water quality and a deeper understanding of 
its causes (Reimer, 2013). These federal mandates resulted in states increasingly 
legislating water policy that seeks to decrease environmental impact and trying to solve 
problems collaboratively to reach federally mandated standards. As a result of this 
increased emphasis on water conservation and ecological values trends in policy have 
shifted towards restoration and collaboration (Reimer, 2013). This is exemplified by an 
almost complete shift from development of infrastructural projects at the federal level to 
maintenance and conservational projects (Reimer, 2013).  
Development of Water Doctrine at State and Regional Levels.  
Due to each state having the sovereignty to manage and regulate its water 
resources as they deemed fit, regions adopted doctrines to manage these resources in 
ways that best suited their needs. For example, in the western region of the U.S. where 
water was in higher demand, states developed a Prior Appropriation Doctrine (Newman, 
2006; Shurts, 2003). Under this system, permits are given “first in use first in right”, 
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where the first to acquire a permit has seniority and thus a stronger claim (“Introduction 
to the Doctrine”, 2011; Newman,2006; Shurts,2003).  This means in times of drought,  
senior claim holders have rights to water over junior claim holders, so long as the use is 
considered beneficial, and one is using the water allotted to them (“Introduction to the 
Doctrine”, 2011; Newman,2006; Shurts,2003).  This stands in contrast with the eastern 
region of the U.S., where a system of Riparian Doctrine has evolved. Under this system, 
water is treated more as a property right (Newman,2006, Ruhl, 2003, “Riparian Theory”, 
2011). Under Riparian Doctrine, anyone can use as much water as they like so long as it 
is “reasonable” and doesn’t prevent anyone else from accessing the water who could 
otherwise (Newman,2006; Ruhl, 2003; “Riparian Theory”, 2011). The following section 
will involve a review of the details of both systems and how they came to exist in 
America. 
Riparian Doctrine 
The Riparian Doctrine as it exists today is very much a product of historical 
abundance, both in America and England. In England, water policy was not particularly 
developed as a result of England having many rivers and a lot of readily accessible 
freshwater. This resulted in relatively few water conflicts and a simplistic water law 
(Apple, 2001). Under this system, all navigable waters were considered the property of 
the crown and treated as such, with the king allowing activities such as drinking, fishing 
and swimming that did not divert water from these navigable waters (Apple, 2001). This 
system created a way in which no individual could create a monopoly on transportation, 
and commerce and water access would function as an attractive amenity for land owners 
(Apple, 2001). As the American colonies were in a similar water situation of little water 
conflict, it was fitting for the English to adopt a similar approach in the colonies. As a 
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result, “free flow” Riparian Doctrine became the basis for American Riparian Doctrine in 
the eastern regions of the U.S. when the American government came into power. 
Free flow Riparian Doctrine largely comes from the view that water is an amenity 
to property (Apple, 2001). Since it was perceived that rivers increased value of a 
property, all those with property along a river had a right to free flowing water. This lead 
to a doctrine allowing the use of water for activities not requiring a diversion, so long as 
the use would leave the water flow “in an undiminished and unpolluted condition” 
(Apple, 2001, p. 5). This system didn’t certify that an individual owned the water; it 
simply associated a claim to water based on the ownership of land capable of accessing it. 
This system would remain sensible until advances in technology allowed rivers to 
become valuable tools for economic growth in early industry.  
As technology advanced, it was realized that streams could be used to fuel 
industry as an energy source, coolant system, and waste disposal tool. This increased 
monetary value associated with water claims drove a change from a “free flow” doctrine 
to a “reasonable use” doctrine (Apple, 2001). Under “reasonable use” doctrine, water 
could be diverted and used by those with access to the river, so long as it was a 
“reasonable” diversion (Apple, 2001). If diverting water for any or all uses on the river 
resulted in a shortage, the burden of the shortage was carried as a common loss to all on 
the river with each party cutting back in equal proportion (Apple, 2001). Furthermore, 
under this doctrine the use of the water was the claim established, not ownership 
(Apple,2001). This meant permissible water appropriation was determined by the impact 
it would have on others utilizing the water (Apple, 2001).  The tenets of Riparian 
Doctrine, in addition to the reasonable use feature, are 1) that only Riparian rights 
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generated by land ownership constitute a claim to water use 2) not using the rights you 
have to your water does not forfeit them, 3) water rights are relative, not absolute, with 
existing claims adjusting as new water claims are made on the land, and 4) that since 
water rights, claims and quantities are in flux based on the claims made on an ongoing 
basis, water allocated in a specific quantity and purpose is never completely secured 
(Apple, 2001). Because of the way communal loss is calculated under this system, it is 
generally considered to be ok to use water in whatever way one wants so long as the use 
is “reasonable” and one owns the land adjacent to the body of water (Newman, 2006; 
Dellapenna, 2002; Ruhl, 2003; Shurts, 2003).  What is considered “reasonable” can vary 
from state to state, but is generally interpreted to be withdrawing less than 100,000 
gallons of water a day so long as it doesn’t interfere with the rights of others relying on 
the source downstream. (Newman 2006; Dellapenna, 2002).   
It is important that this Riparian system as it is understood in a modern context 
came to exist in places where crops and other uses apart from industry could largely be 
meet through rainwater needs (Apple, 2001). This made it a viable system in much of the 
eastern regions where it was adopted, as diversion of water, even would often result in 
relatively absorbable losses. However, in other areas of the country without abundant 
water resources, this system would not be as effective. Even the eastern regions would 
eventually undergo changes in population and technology that would expose the 
weaknesses of this system as water demands rose.  
Prior Appropriation Doctrine 
In the arid western regions, where water was often scarce and in high demand, 
water rights were formed to treat water in a way that would provide levels of certainty 
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during inevitable times of shortage (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). The Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine was developed in order to meet these needs. 
The history of Prior Appropriation Doctrine as it is understood today comes from 
Spanish rule and the mining industry (Apple, 2001, Newman, 2006).  Under Spanish rule, 
ownership of water resided with the state, and it was treated as a public good (Apple 
2001).  
With the crown owning the water, the crown would focus on securing enough water 
for a town to use for public activities such as drinking, fishing, and navigating (Apple 
2001). Only after enough water had been secured for public use would the crown begin to 
issue permits to individuals (Apple 2001).  
This established that first and foremost rights to the water lay with the needs of the 
public, and any subsequent individual permit only being honored in cases where the 
public’s need had been meet (Apple, 2001). This value structure of emphasizing 
community need over the individual was well suited to the American west as a result of 
the mining taking place there (Apple, 2001). Mining requires large amounts of water and 
has the potential to negatively impact water quality and access for those downstream 
(Apple, 2001, Newman 2006). This permit system, honoring the needs of the public 
guaranteed to secure clean water for daily living, as well as allowed miners to exploit the 
resource to the fullest level of economic achievement (Apple, 2001).  
Furthermore, this system reflected the way in which miner’s allocated rights to 
minerals, with the right holder having a claim to the mineral so long as the miner 
continued to make use of the resource they were claiming (Newman, 2006). When miners 
claimed rights to gold, the land they used was not considered to be theirs, but was in fact 
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considered public domain (Apple, 2001). Therefore, claiming gold meant claiming use of 
the land, so long as the claimer occupied it  (Apple, 2001, “Introduction to the doctrine”, 
2011). This would be reflected in the beneficial use clause, and “use it or lose it” 
mentality of Prior Appropriation Doctrine (Newman, 2006). If one is not using the 
resource as claimed, it gets passed to the next in line to benefit (Apple, 2001, 
“Introduction to the doctrine”, 2011, Newman, 2006). 
 Additionally, miners established junior and senior right holders in the way they 
allocated water disputes amongst themselves. In diverting the water necessary for their 
beneficial project, one was said to have appropriated it, and thus placed their claim on the 
water. If any miner upstream then withdrew and appropriated water in a way that 
prevented your previously established appropriation, it was deemed a later claim, and 
would not be honored. This resulted in the “first in time, first in right” clause of Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine (Newman, 2006).  
As the American government came to control these lands in the west, it became 
obvious that they lacked a firm enough grasp on the territories to functionally regulate 
water consumption, and thus left issues of water allocation to the states (Getches, 2001). 
The states then adopted the policies based that had been developed as previously 
described. This meant much of the western United States adopted the Prior Appropriation 
Doctrine.  
Under Prior Appropriation Doctrine in the U.S., resources are largely considered to 
be properties of the state, with access granted to users based on permits administered by 
the government. These permits generally required three conditions. 1) An intent to divert 
water for a beneficial use, 2) an actual diversion of water, and 3) an application of the 
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water to the beneficial use intended (Newman 2006, Stephenson 2000). The system also 
utilizes temporal rights of claim holders, establishing “junior” and “senior” right holders, 
where one cannot infringe upon a previously established claim, as was the case in in “first 
in time, first in right” practices (Newman, 2006). The system adopted in the early United 
States also made use of  “use it or lose it” practices as a result of the government 
maintaining a fundamental ownership of the resource, making holding the resource while 
not using it equivalent to squatting (Apple, 2001).  
However, as the American conception of property and ownership seems to be 
ubiquitous, prior appropriation does encounter a riparian sense of ownership of property. 
This can result in some interesting grey areas of law. When purchasing land with access 
to bodies of water, it seems to imply a right to the water at some level. In turn it seems 
that then water claims made upstream before the purchase of the land shouldn’t not 
prevent ta land owner from accessing water, regardless of when the upstream claim was 
made (“Introduction to the Doctrine”, 2011).  This allowance of land ownership based 
claims to water exists in many state doctrines, even though no divertive or appropriative 
claim of water may have been made. This however does not leave the landowner as the 
owner of the resource, with ownership of the water still fundamentally residing with the 
state. All of this seems to pose potential problems as a result of the clashing between 
Prior Appropriation and Riparian allocation. This can be seen in court cases such as Irwin 
v Phillips, California 1855 (“Introduction to the Doctrine”, 2011). And while the Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine is a great tool for development and having a decent ability to 
balance the allocation of resources based on fairness, it also has its shortcomings in its 
implementation. 
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As a result of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine and the Riparian Doctrine developing 
under particular conditions to meet particular needs, the ever-changing demands on water 
resources has resulted in the doctrines being altered on a state by state basis over time. In 
the next section, I will examine how these systems exist in todays complicated water 
landscape. 	  
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Chapter 3: Findings 
 
 After having explored the origins of water policy, this section will examine the 
water system exists today, the current trends at the state and federal level, and the 
mechanisms that allow these systems to interact. 
 
Modern State and Local Water Policy 
As outlined in the history of Prior Appropriation Doctrine and Riparian Doctrine, 
both have their weaknesses and strengths. As water supplies and demands shift, the 
weaknesses of each system are exposed and states act accordingly.  As a result, 50 
different water policies have come to exist in the states, and each state seems to be in one 
of three categories 1) Riparian 2) Prior Appropriation or 3) a hybrid of the two (Getches, 
2001 Reimer, 2013). However, more and more of these doctrines are moving into the 
hybrid category. 
The Riparian Doctrine, adopted in lands with abundant water resources, is poorly 
equipped to deal with issues of water allocation as a result of the doctrine being based on 
an assumption of unlimited resources (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). This results in a 
vague system for water management, where the resource is treated largely as an amenity 
and claims being a result of land ownership. (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). 
Furthermore, as a result of purposes of water use not being differentiated, they are treated 
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equally (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). This makes it difficult for the Riparian system 
to protect or regulate any particular use of the water, such as drinking, agriculture, or 
navigation (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). This inability to effectively regulate a 
fundamentally finite resource has created problems in the east where population growth 
increases stress on the resources (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  
Prior appropriation, on the other hand, suffers a different series of woes. The 
development of junior and senior rights holders place barriers to new regulation and 
appropriation of water (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  This is made more complicated 
by the fact that many of the regulations and claims being considered today have benefits 
that are difficult to express in quantifiable market terms, and thus hard to justify (Deason, 
Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  With each of these systems not being fully adequate, we have 
begun to see a convergence towards more complex and homogenous systems across the 
50 states (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  
 Riparian Doctrine in the eastern regions has grown to allow more particular 
management of resources, with at least 20 eastern states implementing supplemental 
permit systems to their Riparian Doctrine (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  To do this, 
many governments have implemented ideas of temporal rights and reserving ownership 
of resources for the public good to gain control over resource allocation (Deason, Schad, 
& Sherk, 2001). This theme has been reflected in western states’ doctrines, with new 
policy being developed to allow consideration of public benefit against previously 
established claims (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). Both of these indicate a national 
trend of states’ allocations of water being tailored to allow for equitable priorities 
(Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  
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While states are moving towards seizing more control in terms of their ability to 
allocate water as needed, states are also experiencing a squeeze from federal mandates. 
These mandates require that states meet water quality and pollution standards 
administered by the EPA (Reimer, 2013). While this policy requires state action, which 
can sometime be costly, the Unfunded Mandate Act of 1995 protects the states (Boyd, 
1997). As a result, the EPA offers loan programs that can help municipalities tackle these 
problems. Examples of these programs are the Clean Water State Revolving Fund, and 
the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund, which offer loans for approved projects 
pertaining to their respective acts (Reimer, 2013). And while these environmental 
regulations do not directly allocate state water resources, they frequently tie states’ hands 
to take actions and adjust priorities. To help meet these standards, states are increasingly 
adopting watershed-based approaches to tackle these problems. 
As an increasing focus on water quality at the federal level is taken, states 
maintain a particular interest in supply. With water use increasing 209% over the 50 
years leading to the 21st century, it is not shocking that concerns over supply and demand 
drive policy decisions.  However with these increases in demand of 209% outpacing 
population growth of 90% during time period, it should be no surprise states turned their 
focus to issues of efficiency and conservation, as opposed to seeking new water resources 
(Allin, 2008, Reimer, 2013).  
These policies are based around attempts to fix inefficiencies not only at an 
infrastructural level, but at a market level. As a result of public works being undertaken 
with taxpayer money, the government has subsidized the cost of water (Allin, 2008, 
Reimer 2013). This has generated an artificially low price of water, and has resulted in 
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inefficient markets contributing to overconsumption of the resource (Allin, 2008, Reimer 
2013).  While an obvious problem, the solutions are complex and states are exploring a 
variety of options. Additionally, institutional inefficiencies are being explored, as 
fragmented decision-making is perceived as contributing to efficient allocation and 
management of water (Reimer, 2013).  
Another modern issue in water management at the state level is ground water 
rights.  As a result of technology only recently enabling widespread access to aquifers, 
the majority of groundwater use has begun since the turn of the 20th century (Schlager, 
2006). Because of this, many states attempted to apply doctrines of use from their 
established surface water policies to their ground water resources (Reimer, 2013, Getches 
2001, Schlager, 2006).  This presents problems, however, particularly in the western 
regions where temporal rights are prevalent.  
In the timeline of when a given resource was accessed, surface water claim 
holders are largely the senior rights holders (Reimer, 2013, Schlager, 2006). This is a 
result of when technology would enable claim holders to appropriate ground water for 
use (Reimer, 2013, Schlager, 2006). However, states largely do not recognize surface and 
ground water as connected. Instead, states evaluate ground water claims holders relative 
to other ground water rights holders, and do not view surface water right holders as 
having senior claims compared to groundwater holders (Reimer, 2013, Schlager, 2006). 
This poses problems as certain aquifers; called tributary basins, are connected to surface 
water. Thus, it does make sense to treat ground and surface water as separate entities in 
these cases. In addition to placing groundwater rights at an advantage in their ability 
circumnavigate issues of being junior right holders, groundwater is much cheaper to 
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divert (Reimer, 2013, Schlager, 2006). These factors encourage the overuse of ground 
water resources (Reimer, 2013; Schlager, 2006). 
 In the eastern regions similar problems have arisen. As a result of the loose  
“reasonable use” clause, states often failed to prescribe proper quantities in which people 
could pump water from ground water resources (Reimer, 2013). This is a particular 
problem with a resource that is cheap to divert from (Reimer, 2013). As conflicts 
developed in the eastern regions, many states applied Prior Appropriation Doctrine for 
ground water allocation; however, many states still do not treat ground and surface water 
as connected (Reimer, 2013).  As of today, Nebraska is the only state treating ground and 
surface water under the same laws (Reimer, 2013).  
Ground water issues continue to complicate, as some of its unique characteristics 
continue to increase its demand. The fact that aquifers are not prone to evaporation in arid 
environments makes them prime candidates for western water supplies, a concept only 
furthered by the fact that aquifers are not impacted by seasonal drought in a meaningful 
way (Schlager, 2006). These features have combined with shortages of western surface 
water to result in two thirds of groundwater use occurring in 17 western states (Reimer, 
2013). Additionally, as a result of aquifers being isolated from pollutants, aquifers have 
become an attractive option for cities seeking to avoid costs associated with meeting new 
Federal drinking water standards (Schlager,2006). Instead of investing money to maintain 
and clean surface water resources, it is often cheaper to simply switch to pumping from 
pollutant-insulated aquifers (Schlager,2006). These characteristics make groundwater use 
tempting. However, none of these uses encourage fostering understanding or stewardship 
of the resource, and their being shielded from the surface encourages the opposite. 
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The processes involved in mapping aquifer boundaries are time consuming and 
expensive processes (Schlager, 2006). Further, developing the models to understand 
inputs and outputs affecting these resources is even more complex, resulting in a great 
lack of knowledge about the impact of withdrawals on an aquifer system (Reimer 2013, 
Schlager, 2006). Lastly, the fact that aquifers and their watersheds often cross state lines 
does not encourage any given state to properly investigate these resources. All of these 
factors result in an appealing and un-seeable resource that has suffered a great deal of 
overuse (Reimer, 2013). Because of this, many states are faced with dropping water 
tables (Reimer, 2013). This loss of access can drive conflict between those who have 
invested in developing access to these resources  (Reimer, 2013, Schlager, 2006). 
Furthermore, these disputes have higher levels of occurrence and intensity, compared to 
surface water disputes (Schlager, 2006). Since parties did not understand the amount of 
water in the aquifer, or see water levels dropping, parties were not aware of potential 
shortages until they occurred (Schlager, 2006).  This means by the time of shortage more 
capital had been invested in developing these resources than would have with complete 
information, and less preemptive planning had been done  (Schlager, 2006). This 
principle is mirrored in the development of ground water policy, with a lack of 
information and visible conflict resulting in a policy lagging behind use of the resource.   
A prime example of this is the Supreme Court dispute over the Sparta Sands 
Aquifer. Today, Mississippi is locked in a dispute with Tennessee over water rights to the 
Sparta Sands Aquifer. As water is pumped out of the aquifer in Memphis for use and sale, 
the water table of the aquifer has sunk one to one and a half feet every year for the last 40 
years (Upholt, 2015). In the future, this lowering of the water table has the potential to 
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prevent use of the aquifer to those unable to afford a deeper well. Additionally, the 
continuous withdrawals from the aquifer have created a cone of depression, displacing 
water laterally across the Mississippi border, into Tennessee (Upholt, 2015). This has 
resulted in a formal lawsuit being filed, and the Supreme Court granting a bill of 
complaint to be filed by the state of Mississippi against the state of Tennessee, the City of 
Memphis, and Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division. While Mississippi is attempting to 
sue over a violation of sovereignty, claiming the lateral displacement of the water is 
functionally theft; the case is unlikely to pass. This is because the resource in dispute 
appears to be an interstate resource, and therefore, is subject to an equitable 
apportionment. Disputes like this are not uncommon, and in the next section of the 
findings, I will outline the various mechanisms for resolving these disputes. 
Interstate Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
 In the United States, states have a level of sovereignty. This sovereignty extends 
to the control of resources inside of their jurisdictions. However, this opens up 
opportunity for conflict over shared resources that must be resolved. Since these states 
are not allowed to resolve their disputes through violence, other ways of resolving these 
disputes must be found (“Interstate Allocation”, 2007). As the system exists today, there 
is four ways to manage water conflict in the United States when it comes to interstate 
water resources. As noted in “Water policy in the United States: a perspective” these four 
ways are 1) litigation, 2) legislation, 3) negotiated agreements, and 4) market 
mechanisms (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). Each of these mechanisms has different 
purposes and uses a variety of procedures. 
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Litigation 
The first of these, litigation predominantly occurs in the Supreme Court. In the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court is granted jurisdiction over any dispute between states, 
which includes interstate water conflicts (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). The way the 
state handles such disputes is through an equitable apportionment action. A state can seek 
an equitable apportionment action only if the state filing for damages can demonstrate a 
clear harm to themselves as a result of a diversion of resources (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 
2001). Once this harm is demonstrated, the burden of proof then shifts to the defending 
party. The defending party is then responsible for proving that the diversion is necessary 
and needs to be continued (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). If this can be done, the court 
will then typically appoint a “special master” to arrange an equitable apportionment 
(Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). An equitable apportionment is a federally recognized 
allocation of resources which attempts to take into account the needs of both parties 
(Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  
However, there are other ways for litigation to occur in lower courts if states 
choose to intervene. In matters where national permits are required for diversions of 
water by the states, U.S. District courts issue these permits (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 
2001). If in the issuing of these permits a state challenges the issuance of the permit, and 
the court honors the objection, then the issue falls under the aforementioned jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). Since the permit is now officially 
a dispute between states, it must be heard in the Supreme Court if the process is to 
continue (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). In practice, this can allow a state to block the 
issuing of another states permit for water use if the Supreme Court will not hear the case.  
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Legislation 
The next way interstate water conflict can be resolved is through legislation. 
Similar to litigation, legislation results in an outcome in which the federal government 
decides a resources allocation. In the Constitution, the legislature is invested with a great 
deal of power. Utilizing this power there have been occasions, held up by the Supreme 
Court, in which the legislature made water allocation decisions (“Interstate Allocation”, 
2007, Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). One such example is the Arizona vs. California, 
373 US 546 (1963) Supreme Court case (“Interstate Allocation”, 2007, Deason, Schad, & 
Sherk, 2001). In this case, there was a dispute over how much water the states of Arizona, 
Nevada, and California were allowed to divert from the Colorado River, with the states of 
Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nevada voicing concerns about not receiving a proper 
share (“Interstate Allocation”, 2007).  The Supreme Court ruled that the answer lay in the 
previously passed Boulder Canyon Project Act (“Interstate Allocation”, 2007, Deason, 
Schad, & Sherk, 2001). This means the legislature had allocated water in the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act. Furthermore, Congress may have the ability to create institutions 
with the authority to regulate water.  
It has been a point of interest that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as 
granted power in the Federal Power Act, may have the ability to allocate water resources 
on rivers where federally licensed hydro-electric projects exist (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 
2001). Since the Supreme Court has ruled that national interest in the development of 
hydro-electric energy may outweigh states interests, there is plausible grounds for the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission having the authority to allocate water (Deason, 
Schad, & Sherk, 2001). And while further litigation concerning if the Federal Power Act 
and the Boulder Canyon Project Act are similar enough to be scrutinized under the same 
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Supreme Court precedent, the conversation not being about Congressional limitations on 
creating such legislation indicates it is possible (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). 
Negotiated Agreement 
The next form of conflict resolution is the negotiated agreement. And while there 
are many forms of negotiated agreements, the most common for managing interstate 
water resources is the interstate compact. In an interstate compact, states are authorized to 
negotiate control of resources without having the resources allocation being decided at a 
federal level (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001; Newman, 2006). However, before states 
may enter into negotiations, Congress must approve the negotiations, and following the 
negotiations, Congress must approve the outcomes (“Interstate Allocation”, 2007, 
Newman, 2006). Finally before the compact is finalized, it must receive a presidential 
signature (“Interstate Allocation”, 2007, Newman, 2006). Following finalization, the 
interstate compact is considered to behave in the same way as a Congressional Act 
(Newman, 2006).  
 This system for allocating water relatively independent of the federal government 
is useful in a few different ways. First, it seems preferred by states as a way to 
circumvent the heavy costs associated with a battle in federal courts (Newman, 2006).  
Additionally, some governors in the southeast have discussed their preference of 
interstate compacts as they maintain a level of state autonomy not available in litigation 
or legislation (Newman, 2006). The Supreme Court has even gone so far to say interstate 
compacts are often the preferred method of water allocation as they are "more likely to be 
wisely solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part 
of representatives of the States ... than by proceeding in any court, however, constituted" 
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(Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001,p. 190). While this is some high praise, interstate 
compacts have some drawbacks.  
For example, the previously mentioned southeastern governors, who lauded the 
autonomy and lower legal costs associated with interstate compacts, spent millions of 
dollars each to negotiate an interstate compact (Newman, 2006). Furthermore, despite the 
millions spent, none of these governors would reach an interstate compact agreement 
(Newman, 2006). Additionally, as a result of the 11th Amendment, preventing a state 
from acting on behalf of a citizen in a suit against a separate state, violations of compacts 
often end in the defending state suing the prosecuting state (Newman, 2006). The 
defending state will claim the prosecuting party in the compact dispute is acting on behalf 
of a citizen and therefore is unable to levy a complaint (Newman, 2006). This undermines 
the ability of  interstate compacts to function properly (Newman, 2006).  Lastly, with the 
introduction of regulatory legislation with ecological conservation goals, such as the 
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act, there is more that has to be considered 
when making a compact than merely issues of water use (Newman, 2006). 
Market Mechanisms 
One of the last tools that can be used to regulate interstate water conflicts is 
market mechanisms.  As a result of the commerce clause, it has been ruled that states 
cannot place unreasonable barriers on the transfer of waters between states (Deason, 
Schad, & Sherk, 2001). There have been arguments made that this could be grounds for  
lifting of policy barriers to water transference (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001). The 
argument then is that if institutions do not intervene, and the value of water can be 
quantified in market terms, one could use the hand of the market to solve problems of 
water allocation (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001).  While in theory, this is a possible 
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solution, there is also an obvious lack of these systems being used effectively today. 
Additionally, questions of ones ability to quantify the value of such an essential resource, 
and then the markets ability to allocate water in a way that reflects ecological needs raises 
skepticism about market mechanisms being good solutions. These critiques also do not 
take into account the logistics associated with stripping away the policy necessary to 
allow such a market to exist, or the results of this removal of policy. However, as of 
2013, 25 different programs are reported as being in some stage of development for using 
market solutions to meet pollution standards (Reimer, 2013).  
Modern Federal Water Policy 
 One of the best ways to explain the difficulty with categorizing the modern state 
of federal water policy is to explain the fragmented and convoluted nature of the federal 
institutions governing water (Apple, 2001, Reimer, 2013, Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 
2001).  
 For example, the United States Armey Corps of Engineers does not maintain the 
same role it once did building massive projects (Reimer, 2013). Today, the United States 
Armey Corps of Engineers is a large agency responsible for maintaining the navigability 
of waterways, undertaking maintenance projects, and maintaining and operating flood 
control structures (Reimer, 2013) To do this, the United States Armey Corps of Engineers 
manages 12,000 miles of navigable waterways and 600 dams with their small army of 
37,000 civilian employees (Reimer,2013). The United States Armey Corps of Engineers 
roles begin to overlap with other agencies, however, as they often aid in advising federal 
and state agencies attempting construction and restoration projects, as well as going so far 
as to conduct restoration projects on federally owned property (Reimer, 2013). 
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Similarly, the modern Bureau of Reclamation focuses on managing maintenance 
projects for existing water infrastructure in the western U.S., particularly related to water 
supply and hydroelectric power, and like the United States Armey Corps of Engineers, is 
turning its eyes towards restoration projects (Reimer, 2013). The Bureau of Reclamation 
controls a number of reservoir sites in conjunction with the National Park Service and 
Forest Service, and additionally, uses the reservoirs as the largest water wholesaler in the 
country (Reimer, 2013).  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is primarily in charge of 
maintaining water quality and administering standards set in the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
and Safe Drinking Water Act (Reimer, 2013). The CWA is a huge program that allows 
the EPA to impose water quality standards as well as administer a permit system for 
pollution (Reimer, 2013). The EPA administers this permit system in conjunction with 
states to enact the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (Reimer, 2013). 
Furthermore, should states fail to meet standards the EPA sets, the EPA has the ability to 
intervene in state operations and force the necessary actions to reach quality standards 
(Reimer, 2013). While the focus of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
is on point source pollution emissions, the EPA has also begun funding and assisting 
states to reduce non point source pollution (Reimer, 2013). 
While some of the institutions regulating water resources are not shocking, like 
the previously mentioned EPA, Bureau of Reclamation, and Army Corps of Engineers, it 
does not stop here. One study indicated 25 separate federal agencies having some role in 
managing water resources (Reimer, 2013).  This results in overlapping responsibilities, 
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fragmentation of powers, and decentralized planning. And this phenomenon seems 
reflected in the bodies that generate the legislation guiding these agencies.  
At the national level, the parties responsible for developing water policies are 
“fragmented among at least thirteen Congressional committees, twenty-three 
Congressional subcommittees, eight Cabinet level departments, six independent agencies 
and two White House offices”  (Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001p. 188).  This 
decentralized decision-making can make it difficult to discern trends in federal 
operations, much less to identify goals of the federal government during any given time 
frame.  
One noticeable modern trend is the expansion of the scope of federal power over 
water resources. For instance, the federal government has passed Acts increasing 
agencies’ responsibilities through legislation. Recently the EPA and United States Armey 
Corps of Engineers worked together to pass the Waters of the United States Act, 
expanding their areas of jurisdiction to all navigable waters, including territorial seas 
(Bakst, 2016). However, especially in modern periods of devolvement, this legislation 
draws criticism from those who are already concerned about federal actors overstepping 
their Constitutional bounds (Bakst, 2016, Botsch, 2008, Boyd, 1997). This expansion of 
power is also accomplished through creating regulatory standards states must meet. For 
example, by passing increasingly stringent standards for water quality, the federal 
government can force states into action and cooperation without technically requiring 
states to take any particular action.  This has caused a great deal of collaborative action at 
state and regional levels, as actors strive to meet quality standards for shared resources. 
The Unfunded Mandate Act of 1995, requiring cost benefit analysis, has balanced these 
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actions and has lead increasingly to block grants (Botsch, 2008). However, proponents of 
state rights still criticize these policies as attacking state sovereignty. 
These initiatives by the EPA promoting water quality do capture the focus on 
water moving from a focus on water as an economic tool, to encompass an ecological 
view of water. Increased focus on infrastructural maintenance as opposed to massive 
construction projects echo this sentiment. Similarly, so does the passing of legislation 
requiring increased examination of the environmental impacts of new projects.  The 
National Environmental Policy Act is one such piece of legislation, requiring 
environmental impact assessments of a federal project before the project can begin 
(Reimer, 2013). The Endangered Species Act prevents public and private actions that 
threaten endangered species or their habitats (Reimer, 2013). The Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act allows Congress to designate particular waterways as protected in their “natural free-
flowing condition” (Reimer, 2013).  Additionally, the Federal Power Act established that 
all private hydroelectric facilities must be federally licensed in order to ensure the 
facilities are in compliance with both the Clean Water Act as well as the Endangered 
Species Acts (Reimer, 2013). These trends coincide with the increasing concerns of water 
scarcity throughout the U.S., with policy not only seeking to protect quality of freshwater 
resources and other environmental factors, but also to increase efficiency of the use of 
our water (Reimer, 2013).   
At the federal level, a current trend driven by increased water consumption is 
water scarcity policy. As the United States is ranked last in an international study of 
water efficiency, working to solve these inefficiencies is a good way to address problems 
with possible water supply shortages (Allin, 2008). In particular, agencies such as the 
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EPA have begun heading up a number of initiatives. These initiatives range from 
studying physical inefficiencies of systems, such as irrigation practices, to creating a 
more informed consumer base to address market inefficiencies (Reimer, 2013). While 
many of these initiatives indicate a need for funding scarcity priorities, throughout much 
of the 2000’s, Congress has remained focused on implementing water quality measures 
(Reimer, 2013). 
In conclusion, while there are some overarching trends in modern federal water 
policy, as Apple (2001) notes, policies are being made in an “ad hoc and decentralized 
manner” that may result in a lack of a unified federal policy and an inability to articulate 
water priorities. Furthermore, as devolvement discourages federal intervention in 
decision making in policy, areas that represent interstate problems require centralized 
solutions. This leaves the federal influence of water policy at an interesting impasse.  	  
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Federalism in Water Policy  
 
This analysis will offer an explanation of why the relationship between federal 
and state governments exists as it does, and the strengths and weaknesses that exist as a 
result. To do this we will develop a theoretical understanding of how the state and federal 
water policies have developed, before analyzing the relationship between the two. 
State Analysis  
At the state and local levels, water policy mostly concerns itself with issues of 
supply and the allocation of water resources. This is particularly effective, as compared to 
the federal level, states have higher visibility to the needs of their constituency, and 
therefore, an ability to adapt more quickly to solve crisis in their jurisdiction. 
Additionally, more direct ties to their constituencies create a higher level of 
accountability, and visibility for developing policy to efficiently manage the resource. 
The evidence for state and local government’s ability to quickly adapt to meet the needs 
of their constituents can be seen in various places.  
A prime example of this is as water scarcity has begun to impact communities, 
City governments have worked to develop innovative solutions to these problems. In 
areas such as Texas and Colorado, cities have turned to waste water reclamation to meet 
the needs of their citizens (Atkins, 2014). Additionally, as surface water has become 
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polluted, cities have turned to aquifers for clean water (Schlager, 2006). Physical 
proximity and a limited scope of responsibility allow for a deeper understanding of the 
problems a population faces. This results in nuanced solutions to these problems. 
Similarly, a direct line of accountability to the constituency drives policy makers to seek 
these solutions in order to gain reelection. This strength has been highlighted as states 
have taken on increased roles in water policy during devolvement, and the federal 
government equips states with blocked grants (Botsch, 2008). However, state 
governments also seem to suffer as a result of direct visibility to a particular constituency. 
Constituency is shared between local, state, and federal levels of government. For 
example, an Austenite is a Texan, and Texan is an American.  Contrarily, states cannot 
share constituencies, nor can cities. An Austenite is not a New Yorker, and a Texan is not 
a Californian. However water resources defy these horizontal boundaries of constituency, 
with many rivers and aquifers existing as interstate resources. As a result of this limited 
jurisdiction being matched against interstate resources, states are poorly equipped to deal 
with interstate resources.   
As a result of the shared nature of water resources, any benefits from policy 
affecting the interstate resources are spread to all constituencies that can access it.  This 
makes it unappealing for any particular state to shoulder the cost of addressing the issues 
of an interstate resource. Further, the complexity and vastness of interstate resources 
create costly solutions to problems plaguing interstate resources. As a result, actors are 
less likely to pursue interstate resource policy. Simply, there is less visible benefit to a 
policymakers’ constituency per dollar spent on issues handling interstate resources than 
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on intrastate issues. This results in a lack of understanding, development, and stewardship 
of interstate resources.  
This idea is exemplified in the development of policy managing groundwater 
resources. Because of their large and obscured nature, there is a high cost associated with 
developing an understanding of the size and location of ground water resources 
(Schlager, 2006).  However, this cost pales in comparison with costs associated in 
developing models of the inflows and outflows of aquifers necessary to understand the 
impact of water withdrawals and stresses on them (Schlager, 2006). As a result, we have 
gaps in literature on many of the groundwater resources that are used today. This lack of 
information has greatly contributed to the inefficiencies in state ground water policy. As 
demonstrated with market inefficiencies resulting from artificially low water prices, 
information is key to proper management of a resource. With groundwater, far from 
knowing the value of the good, it is often not known how much of the resource is 
available. And while this groundwater is good for highlighting the problems with state 
water policies, these issues are not unique to ground water.  
Unfortunately, 50 independent and self-interested actors do not reflect the 
interconnected nature of water resources. As a result, inefficiencies resulting in states 
having conflicts over water rights.  However, even as states are independent actors, there 
is opportunity for collaboration. This can be seen in many ways, both in voluntary 
interstate compacts, as well as general watershed based approaches to water management. 
Federal Analysis  
The strengths of the federal government seem to be opposite of the states, with the 
federal government’s vast jurisdiction and fewer direct ties to any particular constituency 
creating its best features.  
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The significant scope of the federal governments’ power over America’s water 
resources has grown over time as a result of federal legislation incrementally extending 
federal reach. While the federal government may not have the ability to directly manage 
water resources, it has the ability to indirectly manage virtually any resource. For 
instance, while in many cases the federal government may have an inability to implement 
programs or undertake projects on a particular intrastate resource, the Clean Water Act or 
Endangered Species Act can indirectly have a great impact on how a state treats the 
intrastate resource. This incredible ability to coerce state action has come under fire for 
overstepping federal bounds, but also has great promise as a possible policy tool. 
Furthermore in interstate resources coercive legislation has a great power to drive 
cooperation amongst states. This can be used to encourage good stewardship of shared 
resources when states may not otherwise seek it. In large part, these coercive water 
policies administered at the federal level are the reason watershed based approaches are 
becoming more prevalent today. 
 In addition to offering up proverbial “sticks” to accomplish its goals, the federal 
system also offers positive incentives to enable states and other entities to reach goals in 
line with federal interest. In doing this, the federal government allows local governments 
to develop nuanced solutions to problems matching the federal agenda, as they exist in a 
given area. The Clean Water State Revolving Fund and the Drinking Water State 
Revolving Fund are examples of these incentives, offering match loans to state and local 
governments carrying out projects aimed to meet Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking 
Water Act requirements (Reimer, 2013).  These tools are methods way to manage 
enacting change towards federal goals while benefitting from states more nuanced 
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understanding of local issues. Furthermore, as a result of Americans trusting local levels 
of government over national levels, it has become increasingly popular as a strategy for 
the federal government to meet their goals (Botsch, 2008). However, as a result of the 
way in which the federal water policy has developed, it is not obvious what these goals 
are. 
Throughout much of history, while state water policy was dictated by the 
demands of state constituencies, as outlined in the historical review, any given time 
period had its interests, and water existed largely as a tool to serve those needs. Water 
policy legislation was predominantly an extension of other issues. If the interest of the 
period was in industrial development, water policy was developed in a way to allow and 
encourage industrial development. This was the case until the green wave environmental 
movement of the 1970’s turned interest in water from strictly economic benefits, to an 
interest in water as an environmental resource. However, this has been a recent 
development occurring during devolvement, and has left the federal government with a 
structure not prepared to manage water as a resource with unique and independent goals. 
As noted by Diana Apple (2001), this has left a federal government that may not be 
capable of identifying problems, articulating priorities, and adapting in a timeframe that 
allows for meaningful action to be taken.   
Federalism in Water Policy Analysis  
In conclusion, states’ independent agendas based around attempts to meet 
demands of their constituency seems to have created a system that is evolving constantly 
to meet problems as they arise and efficiently allocate resources. This quasi-market 
adaptability is incredibility valuable, and serves the states well. Furthermore, recent 
trends of devolvement and a predisposition for Americans to trust local levels of 
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government over national levels has lead to states taking on an increased role in water 
policy (Botsch, 2008). However, these independent agendas do not reflect the connected 
nature of water and can generate problems when dealing with interstate resources. This 
manifests itself as gaps in information, inefficiencies, and conflict. 
However, the federal government seems to hold a lot of promise to mitigate these 
weaknesses. An ability to champion causes that do not hold obvious economic value has 
resulted in the rise of environmental policy at the federal level. Federal legislation being 
inherently broad and superseding state policies allows the federal government to coerce 
state actors towards collaborative action. Additionally, the federal government seems to 
have the ability to intervene where state inabilities to effectively deal with interstate 
resources persist. However, a fragmented federal system has developed as a result of 
water policy being a function of other policy interests and devolvement. This has created 
a framework that is not particularly in tune with, or capable of adapting to, water issues. 
In order to address this, the federal government must create a more centralized and 
streamlined process capable of understanding, adapting to, and solving water problems as 
they arise at both a state and national level. However, the federal government has 
struggled to do this as a result of trends in devolvement encouraging further 
decentralization of the policy making process.  	  
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Chapter 5: Recommendations and Conclusion  
 
Policy  at the state level is largely pertaining to issues of particular water resources, a 
given constituency, and creating local solutions to local problems. Recommendations 
made here aim to enact institutional change at the federal level and adjust the state and 
federal relationship which will effect the deficiencies inherent in the state model of 
dealing with interstate resources. The recommendations are as follows: 
A) Centralize federal legislative and bureaucratic institutions 
B) Create watershed-planning organizations  
C) Conduct a national water assessment  
 Centralize Federal Legislative and Bureaucratic Institutions  
As discussed repeatedly, the spread of the legislature and bureaucracy associated with 
water policy creates a system in which both policy development and implementation is 
fragmented and decentralized (Apple, 2001, Deason, Schad, & Sherk, 2001, Reimer, 
2013). As a result, there seems an inability to create a unified water policy capable of 
reacting to the needs of the water system or achieving goals in managing it (Apple, 
2001).  Furthermore, as a result of water policy being defined by other policy agendas 
until devolvement began, the federal government may not be able to develop coherent 
goals and priorities for managing water as a holistic resource.  
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The first step in empowering the federal government to deal with water issues is 
reinstating the Council of Environmental Quality in the current administration.  As 
established in the National Environmental Protection Act of 1970, the Council of 
Environmental quality is a division in the office of the presidency (“Welcome,” n.d.; 
“What is the National,” 2017). In particular, the Council of Environmental Quality works 
to coordinate federal agencies environmental efforts, and to administer standards set in 
the National Environmental Protection Act (“Welcome,” n.d.; “What is the National,” 
2017). These standards are binding to all federal agencies, and largely concern 
administering environmental impact assessments and environmental assessments 
(“Welcome,” n.d.; “What is the National,” 2017). While this board was not explicitly 
concerned with water, it served as a centralizing force in the bureaucracy, and enabled 
coordination between the various federal agencies. However, since February of 2017, the 
Council on Environmental Quality has vacated their offices and their website has been 
taken down without any indication of future plans for the council. By reinstating the 
Council of Environmental Quality, the executive branch could maintain a more holistic 
understanding of water landscapes, encourage interagency coordination and act to combat 
environmental issues. 
Next, in order to encourage legislation reflecting current issues, a federal legislative 
board with a focus large enough to enable a big picture approach to water management 
should be established. As a result of modern federalism encouraging decentralization of 
responsibilities, a complete centralization of legislative authority in a single committee is 
not feasible. However, while water policy decision-making will be fundamentally 
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fragmented in a sense, this does not mean water information or the water policy agenda 
should be.  
To fix this, a Congressional water plan similar to the 104th Congress’ Contract with 
America could be drafted. The goal would be to bring legislators from the various 
committees and sub committees dealing with water into a round table discussion in order 
to develop a broad understanding of water and the issues affecting it. From there, water 
policy priorities could be developed and pursued in the various legislative bodies that 
exist.  The unified policy enacted by these legislative bodies would result in more 
efficient and clear responsibilities in federal agencies than currently exists. With 
institutions carrying clearly articulated and redefined goals, it becomes easy for federal 
agencies to realign their efforts with updated policies. 
Create Watershed-Planning Organizations  
As discussed in the analysis chapter, states seem particularly well fitted to deal 
with intrastate allocation. This stems from the nature of their jurisdictions allowing an 
ability to address water issues, and a visible accountability to their constituency creating 
an interest in doing so. However, states become less capable where their jurisdiction ends 
and less interested where benefits from their dollars are less visible to their constituency. 
As a result, information gaps surrounding shared resources have emerged. These gaps can 
result both in an inability to mitigate the impact of shortages, and indirectly cause 
shortages as a result of mismanagement of resources (Government Accountability, 2014, 
Reimer, 2013, Schlager, 2006). The latter of these can be seen in cases surrounding 
groundwater as well as market inefficiencies associated with artificially low water costs 
(Government Accountability, 2014, Reimer, 2013, Schlager, 2006). These shortages are 
capable of having economic consequences, as well as drive interstate conflict. Contrarily, 
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closing these gaps creates more appropriate policy at state and federal levels creating 
better management practices and less interstate conflict. As a result, one of the most 
beneficial opportunities for the federal government is in closing information gaps that 
exist in interstate water resources.  
In order to harbor effective communication, as well as collaborative and 
comprehensive policy development, the federal government should create watershed-
planning organizations. These organizations would have jurisdictions and responsibilities 
tethered to a particular watershed, as opposed to a particular task or purpose. For 
instance, as opposed to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission having jurisdiction 
related to hydroelectric power, one could imagine an organization with responsibilities 
pertaining to the Colorado River as a whole. The goals of these institutions would then be 
to promote effective policy solutions by developing a thorough understanding of the 
resource and engaging all parties involved with the resource. 
A good model for this kind of organization already exists in transportation policy, 
with Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO’s). These MPO’s are federally 
mandated and funded for all urban centers with populations over 50,000 (“About 
MPO’s,” n.d.; “Metropolitan Planning,” 2016). These organizations are responsible for 
coordinating between the governor and local governments on issues relating to 
transportation and city planning (“About MPO’s,” n.d.; “Metropolitan Planning,” 2016). 
When a government, city or local, wishes to implement a policy or program, the MPO 
must certify that the initiatives meet state and national standards (“About MPO’s,” n.d.; 
“Metropolitan Planning,” 2016). Additionally, federal funding for transportation projects 
comes through these MPO’s (“About MPO’s,” n.d.; “Metropolitan Planning,” 2016). In 
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doing this, it has enabled the federal government to be sure funding is being used in 
projects that are compliant with federal standards, and encourage collaborative and 
comprehensive approaches by gathering the appropriate parties around a table where 
information has been previously consolidated (“About MPO’s,” n.d.; “Metropolitan 
Planning,” 2016). This approach could be used to great effect if applied to water 
management.  
By establishing federally mandated and funded watershed planning organizations 
for every intrastate water resources, the government could encourage collaborative and 
comprehensive solutions. This collaboration would allow the communities to begin 
closing gaps in literature on water resources. While the logistics associated with bringing 
all federal and state actors associated with the Colorado River is daunting, by distributing 
federal funds through these watershed planning organizations and requiring the watershed 
planning organizations approval for any projects concerning the resource, the necessary 
parties would quickly come to the table. Once gathered, under supervision of the 
planning organization, representatives from each state and agency could address issues 
affecting the resource. Furthermore, these conversations be would guided by readily 
accessible, comprehensive and continuously updated information on the resource. This 
information and cooperation results not only in the kind of problem solving that works 
towards long term solutions, but could serve as a tool to resolve interstate conflict.  
 By having a round table in place, with the respective parties and necessary 
information already present, it would encourage conflict resolution through interstate 
compacts. While litigating an equitable compact is expensive, interstate compacts are not 
necessarily an inexpensive option. As discussed, an interstate compact negotiation comes 
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with no guarantee of finding a solution as a result of the expenses incurred. However, 
these watershed planning organizations both lower the cost of seeking an interstate 
compact by having the information on the resource available, as well as increase the 
likely hood of solutions being reached as a result of an ongoing discourse between the 
associated parties.   
Furthermore, this watershed planning organization could be used to administer 
federal standards and regulation. By requiring certification of federal, state, and local 
initiatives affecting the water resource, the watershed planning organization would 
encourage compliance with federal policy.  
Undertake a National Water Assessment 
 As discussed in this thesis, incomplete information regarding water resources is a 
concern of water managers and is driving shortages in multiple ways. Artificially low 
water costs create market inefficiencies, and groundwater generally not being understood 
is resulting in overuse of the resource. In order to resolve this, I propose another national 
water assessment  
The national water assessment would be an ongoing, comprehensive water use 
and availability study. The goal would be to have comparable to the Second National 
Water Assessment in 1978 in scope, and adhering to standards set out in the 2002 report 
on Concepts for National Assessment of Water Availability and Use. Under these 
standards, the assessment would provide an understanding of “the status and trends in 
storage volumes, flow rates, and uses of water nationwide”, as well as “regional 
information on recharge, evapotranspiration, interbasin transfers, and other components 
of the water cycle across the country ” (U.S. Department, 2002 p. 3). Under these 
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assessment standards, a more comprehensive understanding both of supply and demand, 
the tensions between the two, and the nature of the resources utilized would be gained.  
 If undertaken, an assessment of this sort should be vastly beneficial. By driving a 
deeper understanding of groundwater supplies and demand, one can understand the 
inefficiencies of water supplies at the state level. Additionally, while understanding 
availability of water resources does not solve artificially low prices of water, it helps 
provide information necessary to address the problem effectively. Furthermore, by 
mandating and funding assessments of water supply, it would lead to a better 
understanding of groundwater resources that is currently unavailable.  
 This National Water Assessment would help resolve issues of water allocation for 
states through a more thorough understanding of supply and demand, increase federal 
ability to develop meaningful goals for water management, and help all parties to 
implement more effective policy.  
Conclusion 
The American system of federalism has undergone a great deal of change since 
America’s inception. These changes have manifested themselves in an ongoing tug of 
war over power between the federal and state government. And while an 
oversimplification, since the era of Dual Federalism the federal government increasingly 
gained power until Reagan took office in 1981. However, since 1980 a modern 
movement of federal devolvement has resulted in state governments having more power 
to enact policy, as they deem necessary. This trend has been reflected in water policy, 
with the federal government taking increasing roles in managing America’s water 
resources until the 1980’s and 1990’s when watershed based approaches became popular, 
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and policy focused on collaborative state solutions. While this has empowered states to 
implement nuanced water policy in their jurisdictions, the decentralization of federal 
decision making has also resulted in a federal inability to address the issues in water 
policy that exist as a result of the state model of governance. However, since federalism 
has created a dynamic and ever-changing policy landscape, these issues can be addressed.  
In order to address these problems, the federal government should centralize federal 
legislative and bureaucratic institutions, undertake a National Water Assessment, and 
create watershed-planning organizations. By developing more unified federal processes 
for the creation and implementation of water policy, it will allow for the federal 
government to develop goals for water resources and work to solve problems as they 
arise. By undertaking a National Water Assessment, the federal government can work to 
mitigate the detrimental effects associated with information gaps affecting water policy. 
And lastly, by creating watershed-planning organizations institutions can be created to 
encourage understanding of water resources. 
Ultimately, while trends in devolvement has empowered states to make nuanced 
decisions and take advantage of their adaptable system of water management, it has not 
been particularly helpful resolving issues associated with interstate resources. This has 
only been made more difficult by federal fragmentation of water policy resulting in a real 
lack of a centralized structure able to compensate for these inadequacies. However, by 
consolidating information, bringing together the involved parties, and empowering the 
federal government to take advantage of current trends in cooperation at the state levels, 
the federal government could improve the federalist relationship and create a more 
proactive and unified water policy. 
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